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In recent years, it has become commonplace among the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study authors to regard
the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) primarily as a descriptive health metric. During the first phase of the GBD
(1990–1996), it was widely acknowledged that the DALY had built-in evaluative assumptions. However, from the
publication of the 2010 GBD and onwards, two central evaluative practices—time discounting and age-weight-
ing—have been omitted from the DALY model. After this substantial revision, the emerging view now appears to
be that the DALY is primarily a descriptive measure. Our aim in this article is to argue that the DALY, despite
changes, remains largely evaluative. Our analysis focuses on the understanding of the DALY by comparing the
DALY as a measure of disease burden in the two most significant phases of GBD publications, from their beginning
(1990–1996) to the most recent releases (2010–2017). We identify numerous assumptions underlying the DALY
and group them as descriptive or evaluative. We conclude that while the DALY model arguably has become more
descriptive, it remains, by necessity, largely evaluative.
Introduction
The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study is ‘a system-
atic, scientific effort to quantify the comparative magni-
tude of health loss due to diseases, injuries, and risk
factors by age, sex and geographies for specific points
in time’ (Murray et al. 2012a: 1). The GBD study quan-
tifies disease burden via a measure called disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs).
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During the first phase of the GBD study (1990–1996),
it was widely acknowledged that the DALY model
included evaluative assumptions (Murray, 1994, 1996;
Murray and Lopez, 1996; Murray and Acharya, 1997).1
However, with the publication of the 2010 GBD study,
two central evaluative practices—time discounting and
age-weighting—were discontinued. After a substantial
revision, the emerging view now appears to be that the
DALY is primarily a descriptive measure of overall dis-
ease burden (Murray et al., 2012a,b; Salomon et al., 2012;
Murray and Lopez, 2013; Knudsen et al., 2016).2
In brief, the DALY has seemingly undergone a transi-
tion from being a measure of burden ‘based on explicit
and transparent value choices’ (Murray and Lopez, 1996:
8) to ‘a major step toward a replicable scientific approach
to global descriptive epidemiology’ (Murray et al., 2012b:
2065—our italics).3 This emerging terminology
obscures the fact that several critical evaluative assump-
tions remain embedded within the DALY model. As we
will see, both the magnitude and distribution of disease
burden rely heavily on these evaluative assumptions.
The GBD study was conceived to inform policy-
makers (Murray, 1994; Murray and Lopez, 1996).
Since then, the DALY model has become increasingly
popular in the global health community. Major organ-
izations and institutions, as well as national health
authorities, use this measure,4 and DALY-publications
regularly appear in high-ranking academic journals. By
using DALY data from the GBD study, epidemiological
trends are monitored, disability groups are ranked
according to their disease burden, and health inequity
is quantified.
Our aim in this article is to argue that the DALY
model, despite the recent modifications, remains largely
evaluative. We will restrict our analysis to the assump-
tions underlying the DALY model rather than the
assumptions underlying the GBD study as such.
Moreover, we will focus on the practices and corre-
sponding rationales that have been suggested by the
DALY architects themselves (e.g. Murray, 1994, 1996;
Murray and Lopez, 2013).
This article proceeds as follows: first, we motivate and
review the basics of the DALY model. Next, we examine
and contrast the core DALY assumptions during the two
most significant phases of the GBD: 1990–1996 and
2010–2017. For our purposes, we classify these assump-
tions into two categories: descriptive and evaluative.5 We
conclude that evaluative assumptions are ubiquitous
and that while the DALY model has arguably become
somewhat more descriptive, it necessarily remains large-
ly evaluative.
The Disability-Adjusted Life Year
The DALY model can be viewed as a natural extension of
earlier efforts (1940–1950) to evaluate instead of simply
counting deaths. The initial ambition was to analyze dis-
ease burden beyond the descriptive crude death rates
(CDRs) by instead evaluating deaths according to the
prematurity of their occurrence (see e.g. Dempsey,
1947; Robinson, 1948; Haenszel, 1950). Two decades
later, health- and quality-adjusted life years (HALYs
and QALYs, respectively), and similar models6—under-
took to include the burden morbidity confer on people
while they still are alive, in addition to the disease burden
resulting directly from death. The DALY model was
launched in 1993 with the first GBD study, and its raison
d’être was to obtain a universally applicable measure
integrating morbidity and mortality.
According to the DALY model, morbidity is measured
by assigning disability weights (DWs) to health condi-
tions, where 0 represents the absence of disability,
0DW  1 quantifies the burden that a particular
health condition incurs and 1 is the highest possible
DW, defined as a loss ‘equivalent to death’ (Salomon
et al., 2015: 712). After a condition has been assigned
its DW, the years lived with disability (YLDs) is calculated
as the product of the condition’s duration and its DW,
which account for morbidity. Years of life lost (YLLs),
relative to a reference life expectancy, account for mor-
tality. Finally, YLDsþ YLLs¼DALYs¼ disease burden.
A simplified example of the calculation of lifetime
DALYs for an individual may be helpful. Imagine a per-
son who suffers from A ¼ severe anxiety disorder
(DWA ¼ 0:5) during 8 years of her young adulthood
(see Figure 1).7 This suffering generates duration 
DW ¼ 8 years  0.5 YLDs/year ¼ 4.0 YLDs. Later in
life, the person endures B ¼ chronic neck pain
(DWB ¼ 0:3) which lasts for 15 years, generating
15 years  0.3 YLDs/year ¼ 4.5 YLDs, until she dies at
the age of 70. For 70-year-olds, the DALY reference life
expectancy is 88.9 years, meaning that the person lost
88.9 years  70 years ¼ 18.9 years, which are the YLLs
generated by her (premature) death (Murray et al.,
2012a). Accordingly, the aggregate lifetime DALY
amount is 4.0 YLDs þ 4.5 YLDs þ 18.9 YLLs ¼ 27.4
DALYs. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
The GBD employs this type of calculation to arrive at
estimates of the overall disease burden in a population.
However, in the second phase of the GBD (2010–2017),
the DALY estimates are (usually) given as annual figures
and quantify the total amount of disease burden gener-
ated during that year.
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Descriptive versus Evaluative
Epidemiology
Historically, epidemiologists were chiefly concerned
with the mortality in a population, and mortality rates
were the standard measures of disease burden (in add-
ition to incidences and prevalences). This initial ap-
proach included the CDR and age-specific death rates.
The CDR is the number of fatalities per year per 1000
people. Age-specific death rates are CDRs that are
restricted to a predefined age bracket. The child mortal-
ity rate, for example, reports the CDR for those between
1 and 5 years of age (Porta, 2014). Such descriptive mor-
tality measures have several virtues. In general, they are
simple, transparent, and inherently universal (Haenszel,
1950). Evaluative measures, in contrast, will, by neces-
sity, rely on contested value assumptions.8
No measure of mortality, health or well-being serves
equally well for all purposes. For instance, descriptive
mortality measures do not highlight the fact that indi-
vidual deaths are postponed rather than prevented.
Moreover, they say nothing about whether some deaths
are worse than others. For some purposes, we need
evaluative measures instead (Gamlund and Solberg,
2019).
In the philosophy of science, several frameworks have
been suggested for how values influence the scientific
process (Longino, 1990; Lacey 1999; Douglas, 2009;
2016). Moreover, there is a growing literature on the
philosophy of measurement (see e.g. Cartwright and
Bradburn, 2011; Cartwright and Runhardt, 2014; Tal,
2017). Furthermore, for philosophers of science, it is
common to regard most scientific disciplines as more
value-laden than what is acknowledged by the practi-
tioners within those disciplines. Social and ethical values
permeate scientific endeavors at many different levels
(Chang and Cartwright, 2014).
With regard to the DALY, one framework suggested
by Hausman and McPherson (2006) could serve as an
illustration of the intuitions we draw on. Admittedly,
Hausman and McPherson (2006: 9, Figure 1.2.1) de-
scribe their framework as displaying ‘exaggerated con-
trasts between facts and values’. According to their
caricatured framework, factual claims are characterized
by disagreement that can easily be resolved, hypotheses
that can be determined as true or false, and hypotheses
that are independent of evaluative claims. In contrast,
evaluative claims are characterized by little agreement
and are not easily resolved, hypotheses that cannot easily
be determined as true or false, and hypotheses that are
dependent on factual claims (Hausman and McPherson,
2006: 9).
However, it is difficult, or even impossible, to tease
apart every evaluative aspect from every descriptive as-
pect of the assumptions within the DALY. While this
might sometimes make it difficult to classify an assump-
tion as ‘clearly evaluative’ or ‘predominantly descriptive’
in a manner that would be universally acceptable, we
believe one can often rely on intuitions to discern that
some assumptions contain largely evaluative, as opposed
to descriptive, aspects.
A rigorous account of descriptive assumptions, as
opposed to evaluative ones, remains elusive, and we offer
Figure 1. An illustration of the DALY.
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no formal criteria to distinguish descriptive from evalu-
ative assumptions. Instead, we rely on what we regard as
shared intuitions concerning the classification of the
various aspects of the DALY discussed below. Even if
some readers disagree with some of our intuitions, we
believe that the overall case we present will be
compelling.
The Devils in the DALY
Certain assumptions in the DALY model have been dis-
cussed frequently, such as discounting, age-weighting,
DWs and choice of reference life expectancy (Anand and
Hanson, 1997; Murray and Acharya, 1997; Fox-Rushby
and Hanson, 2001; Lyttkens, 2003; Arnesen and Nord,
1999; Arnesen and Kapiriri, 2004; Voigt, 2012). Aside
from the assumptions above, Murray (1994, 1996) also
addressed the incidence versus prevalence approach and
comorbidity at an early stage. That the DALY is assumed
to be a measure of health rather than well-being has also
been subject to debate (Broome, 2002; Hausman, 2015).
The perhaps most systematic and rigorous work on the
assumptions behind the DALY to date has been con-
ducted by the DALY-architect himself Christopher J. L.
Murray and by the philosopher S. Andrew Schroeder
(Schroeder, 2012, 2017, 2019). In addition to the
assumptions mentioned above, Schroeder adds grouping
of disabilities to the list above (2016).9
In the present exposition, we expand on this list with a
discussion of four further assumptions: intrapersonal
and interpersonal aggregation, individual versus societal
burden, gradualism versus non-gradualism and
commensurability.10
Health versus Well-Being
The health versus well-being debate lies at the core of the
descriptive versus evaluative question. One of the
strengths under which the current DALY is marketed
is that it measures health simpliciter (Voigt and King,
2014). The discussion of this controversial issue began
when the first GBD was launched (Anand and Hanson,
1997; Murray and Acharya, 1997); to date, it has not been
satisfactorily resolved (Schroeder, 2016, 2019). Still, the
DALY authors continue to describe the DALY as an ob-
jective and descriptive measure of health. Indeed, with-
out health simpliciter, much of the mission behind the
DALY may be undermined: one of the great advantages
of the DALY is that it can be universally applied (condi-
tional on measuring health simpliciter). In contrast, most
health jurisdictions mandate that national tariffs for
QALYs are used for health technology assessment
analyses since it is empirically recognized that preferen-
ces do vary between cultures and within populations.
Since the architects of the DALY strive to measure
health descriptively, their methodology has (as previous-
ly mentioned) been revised to remove evaluative com-
ponents (Salomon et al., 2012). Whether the DALY
should measure health or well-being is already thor-
oughly discussed in the literature (e.g. Broome, 2002;
Hausman, 2015). It is unclear whether it is desirable to
ignore the impact of health, let alone if ill health is a
robust and meaningful construct when considered in
isolation of the individuals who are burdened by it
(Arnesen and Nord, 1999; Broome, 2002; Voigt and
King, 2014). Lastly, the health versus well-being debate
also illustrates the need for a careful analysis of that
which we tentatively call the descriptive versus evaluative
distinction in health measurement and epidemiology.
Disability Weights
The quantification of the burden through the so-called
DWs is central to the DALY model. The DW is the device
for modeling the assumption that some conditions are
worse than others. The measuring of the burden of mor-
bidity is carried out by assigning DWs to different con-
ditions: 0 represents the absence of disability, 1
represents the maximal possible disability and inter-
mediate values represent degrees of disability. For ex-
ample, for the DWs set in 2017, severe multiple sclerosis
was assigned a DW of 0.72, while a symptomatic tension-
type headache was given a DW of 0.04 (Global Burden of
Disease Collaborative Network, 2018). These numbers
mean that the burden associated with severe multiple
sclerosis is considered to be 18 times greater than the
burden associated with a tension-type headache, per
unit time.
All work on the DWs in the DALY has relied on one or
more of the standard preference-based evaluation meth-
ods: the person trade-off (PTO), the standard gamble and
the time trade-off.11 In the early GBD studies, the PTO
method was central (Arnesen and Nord, 1999). The cur-
rent practice (as of 2020) is based on utility theory and
draws on discrete choice methodology combined with
the PTO method. Nevertheless, the DALY is currently
referred to as a non-preference-based measure: the ex-
planation provided is that respondents are asked to set
DWs not based on their own preferences, but instead ‘to
state which of the two individuals they would deem as
being healthier than the other’ (Salomon et al., 2015:
713). However, there are reasons to believe that a change
of wording alone cannot transform the inherent
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evaluative nature of such choice tasks into an objective
measurement of health qua health (Voigt and King,
2014).
A preference for something over something else
implies the ranking of one alternative above another.
Some preferences are simple and deeply rooted in our
biology, such as preferring pleasurable sensations over
pain or the taste of healthy nutrients over poisons. Such
preferences tend to appear instinctive and require no
conscious choice of our own. They may reasonably be
referred to as descriptive.12 However, we should not con-
fuse such physiological preferences with deliberative
preferences. The rank order ‘healthier than’ encodes a
high degree of complexity, since this ranking is (sup-
posedly) not an automated input-output procedure.
Rather, it relies on deliberative thinking informed by
both intuitions and arguments, usually a long-term per-
spective, and the processing of information, experience,
and context. Thus, it is hard to escape the view that the
DWs are evaluative by their very construction.13
Second, expert panels set the DWs initially, but, since
the 2010 GBD, the public’s involvement in establishing
DWs has been imperative. The choice of involving the
public can be based on at least two rationales: accuracy
and legitimacy. The DALY architects were arguably
mostly concerned with legitimacy (Salomon et al.,
2012). Hence, the move from the expert toward the pub-
lic view implied the prioritization of public over techno-
cratic legitimacy.14 To add to this, we can easily imagine
that if ordinary people (instead of technocrats) are asked
about their views regarding different conditions, this
may be informative as to what is important for them.
That being said, the YLL construct—which generates the
largest share of the total disease burden worldwide—
remains completely uninformed by the public’s views.
Third, the question remains of whether some condi-
tions are more burdensome than death. Recall that a DW
of 1 has been interpreted as the maximum possible
burden. No ‘worse than death’ values—that is, DWs
above 1—have ever been used in the DALY model.15
Comorbidity is also accounted for in such a way that
no compound health condition can ever be worse than
death (Burstein et al., 2015). This characteristic suggests
the evaluative assumption that life is better than death—
no matter what.
In summary, the DWs remain evaluative because peo-
ple are asked how good or bad different conditions seem
to them. We doubt that any system for setting DWs can
avoid being evaluative (at least, such a system would no
longer measure something that matters). Consequently,
the YLD-component of the DALY is inherently evalu-
ative as well.
Discounting
During the first phase of the GBD (1990–1996), future
DALYs were discounted by a fixed rate of 3% per year.
This practice reduced the YLLs attributed to premature
deaths. Because future years were discounted (combined
with age-weighting), death at birth was not counted as 86
YLLs but rather as approximately 32 YLLs. This discount-
ing practice also implied that if two individuals each lost
20 YLLs and one person lost 40 YLLs, the latter loss would
carry less weight since these YLLs were more distant.
Three reasons were offered for this discounting practice:
(i) the future is shrouded in uncertainty; (ii) health inter-
ventions are likely to improve in the future; and (iii)
people tend to prefer goods in the near rather than the
far future (Murray, 1996; Murray and Acharya, 1997).
Reason (i) can be seen as descriptive as it is based on an
epistemic concern about how to forecast the future. In
isolation, this issue does not concern any value-theoretical
questions. That is to say, it is simply true and indisputable
that the future is shrouded by epistemic uncertainty.
Reason (ii) can also be seen as descriptive. On the one
hand, one may argue that the very concept of improve-
ment itself relates to something evaluative as the improve-
ment implies that something is better than it was before.
Moreover, that something resembling health interventions
is likely to improve may involve value concerns. Such an
improvement may include ‘better health’, ‘better quality
of life’, or ‘better lives’—all evaluative concepts.
On the other hand, there is a correct answer as to
whether health interventions will improve in the future,
and reasonable agreement on the assumption that health
interventions will improve. Thus, given a narrow defin-
ition of evaluative, we may determine reason (ii) to be
descriptive. Reason (iii), however, seems to be evalu-
ative, even in a narrow sense. We can indeed describe
people’s preferences—doing so is a descriptive en-
deavor. Moreover, we can provide true empirical
answers to questions about what preferences people
have. However, recall that deliberative preferences have
an evaluative rather than a descriptive nature. More spe-
cifically, reason (iii) implies the judgment that goods in
the near future are evaluated and ranked as better than
goods in the far future, which is evaluative.
Scholars have heavily debated such discounting
(Anand and Hanson, 1997), and from 2010 GBD and
onwards, it was omitted to make the DALY more de-
scriptive. Nevertheless, this omission was grounded in
yet another evaluative rationale, namely that every life
year should count equally, independently of when in life
it occurs (Murray et al., 2012a).
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Age-Weighting
Another characteristic of the first phase of the GBD stud-
ies (GBD 1990–1996) was age-weighting, which meant
that less weight was attributed to years lived at very
young and very old ages. In this marginal age-
weighting, life years between the ages of 15 and 40
were given the highest relative value, while the years in
the very first phase of life, as well as in the final period,
were given the least relative value. Three main rationales
were offered for this age-weighting: (i) Well-being; peo-
ple themselves may value life years differently at different
life-stages, (ii) Productivity; one may attribute a higher
value to the most productive life years of an individual’s
life, (iii) Well-being interdependence; the belief that some
people play a unique role in providing well-being for
others, such as children and elderly parents (Murray
and Acharya, 1997). We see that (i–iii) are arguably
evaluative: (i) concerns preferences for prudential value
(see the DW discussion below), while (ii–iii) highlight
instrumental value assumptions relating to particular
people. From the 2010 GBD and onwards, this age-
weighting was omitted based on the same evaluative
premise that omitted the discounting practice: that every
life year for every person around the world should count
equally (Murray et al., 2012a).16
Choice of Reference Life Expectancy
The largest part of the total disease burden is generated
by deaths rather than morbidity. Hence, it is crucial to
know how these deaths are evaluated. Several of the
assumptions in the YLL component of the DALY will
have high elasticity: specifically, small changes in the
assumptions may incur large changes in the overall dis-
ease burden. The YLL component of the DALY is based
on the concept of potential years of life lost (PYLL), a
mortality measure that originated in the late 1940s
(Dempsey, 1947; Robinson, 1948; Haenszel, 1950).
In the second phase of the GBD, YLLs are calculated in
the following way. If an individual dies at age 20, her
YLLs are calculated as the temporal distance between
her age of death and a reference life expectancy for her
age group. According to the life table used in the 2010
GBD, this death would generate 86.4–20¼ 66.4 YLLs.
Similarly, a 10-year-old would lose 86.3–10¼ 76.3
YLLs, an 80-year-old 91.0–80.0¼ 11.0 YLLs, and a still-
born child 0–0¼ 0 YLLs (Murray et al., 2012a). This
practice implies that an individual generates more
YLLs the younger she is at the time of death, reaching
a maximum immediately after birth. The YLLs have been
counted from the time of birth throughout the history of
the GBD, but the choice of reference life expectancy has
varied (see e.g. Murray, 1994 versus Murray et al.,
2012a).
Several questions need to be answered in order to cre-
ate a reference life expectancy. To begin with, when do
individuals begin to accrue YLLs? This issue was debated
when the PYLL—the precursor of the YLL—was devel-
oped in the 1940s. Most authors suggested counting
from birth (Dempsey, 1947; Haenszel, 1950), but opin-
ions ranged from including stillbirths (Robinson, 1948)
to counting from age one (Romeder and McWhinnie,
1977). The DALY model starts counting YLLs at birth,
thus excluding all stillbirths. Discussion of this issue,
however, is largely absent in the GBD literature.
From the 1990 GBD until the 2017 GBD, stillbirths
were excluded (i.e. generating 0 DALYs).17 Until the
2010 GBD, the death of 10-year-olds was measured as
the greatest possible amount of DALYs lost due to the
combined effect of age-weighting and discounting. Since
the 2010 GBD, however, neonatal deaths have been
attributed the maximal possible burden (approximately
86 DALYs). In the 2017 GBD, stillbirths were counted in
the mortality statistics but not in the DALY count that
generates disease burden (Wang et al., 2016). As of 2020,
stillbirths do not generate any disease burden in the GBD
study. The question of the age at which we should begin
to count DALYs is an important aspect of the GBD, and
merely small changes in the lower age limit would result
in a large difference to the total disease burden.
Since a discussion of reasons for setting a lower age
limit is lacking in the DALY literature, we are led to im-
agine candidate reasons for this practice. This issue ul-
timately relates to the following question: what is disease
burden? Providing an answer to this question is not triv-
ial. One approach is to argue that disease burden is usu-
ally something we experience, and since embryos and
fetuses (usually) cannot have experiences, they cannot
be subjected to any disease burden. However, such an
approach seems unreasonable given that the majority of
the total disease burden is a direct result of YLLs, which
occur when individuals have died and therefore cannot
experience at all. Another strategy could be to argue that
individuals can be harmed by their own death only after
they are born. Such an approach would involve value-
theoretical considerations regarding the harm of death.
A third approach is to argue that the lower age limit is set
at birth because this is in line with ordinary norms and
sensible in a practical sense. However, even this third
approach involves choices that are value-laden and sub-
ject to reasonable disagreement. In relation to this,
Murray’s claim that every life year should count equally
for everyone disregards the discontinuous jump in dis-
ease burden between fetuses and neonates.
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Furthermore, the question remains as to what the
upper limit for YLLs should be. In the first GBD, the
reference life expectancy used for measuring YLLs was
80.0 years at birth for men and 82.5 years at birth for
women (Murray, 1994). This female reference life ex-
pectancy was based on Japan’s, which had the highest
life expectancy at the time (Murray and Acharya, 1997).
The decrement of 2.5 years for males was arbitrarily esti-
mated. This sex difference was later omitted. From the
2010 GBD, age-specific reference life expectancies are
synthesized by choosing the lowest national age-
specific death rate recorded (Murray et al., 2012a). The
use of these so-called synthetic reference life expectancies
means that the longevity used in YLL-computations is
estimated so that individuals always enjoy the lowest
recorded national age-specific death rate.
Another important issue concerns the question of
whether the reference life expectancy should be local or
universal. The initial approach suggested in the PYLL
used national life expectancies (e.g. Dempsey, 1947).
Throughout all of the GBD studies, however, the refer-
ence life expectancy has been universal. This means that
death at, say, age 60 is attributed the same number of
DALYs regardless of the nationality of that individual.
Murray explicitly mentions that the universal applica-
tion of synthetic life expectancy is grounded in an ‘egali-
tarian nature’. That is to say, if one were to count YLLs
from local life expectancy, then preventing the death of a
40-year old woman in a high-income country (with
higher life expectancy) would lead to a larger reduction
in the global burden of disease than preventing the death
of 40-year-old in a developing country (with low life
expectancy; Murray, 1996).
Finally, should the reference life expectancy be fixed or
progressive? Some of the very first PYLL measures were
fixed, which meant that one calculated the PYLL for all
individuals based on life expectancy at birth (Dempsey,
1947). In all of the GBD studies, however, the reference
life expectancy has been progressive. This means that one
uses statistical tables, which show life expectancy for
each age and make age-adjustments so that the older a
person becomes, the higher her life expectancy will be.
This progressive approach is reflected in the YLL so that,
while life expectancy falls for each year a person ages, it
does not fall with a full year. The use of such progressive
instead of fixed life-expectancy models implies that
more YLLs are attributed to the elderly, more YLLs are
generated in total, and the DALY acquires a slightly less
egalitarian flavor.
There are a few things to note about the four assump-
tions above: they have competing alternatives, and there
is reasonable disagreement on the alternatives. Taken
together, we see that even though life expectancy is de-
scriptive in an empirical sense, the choice of one system
of reference life expectancy over another as a way of
calculating YLLs is evaluative. There are reasons to be-
lieve that we cannot choose systems of reference life
expectancies in a value-neutral way (see Anand and
Reddy, 2019).
The Incidence versus Prevalence Approach
Theoretically, the two components of the DALY—the
YLD and the YLL—can be measured both as incidence
and as prevalence parameters. Because death rates are
incidence rates, the YLL has been accounted for by inci-
dence rate by default (Murray, 1994, 1996), but this de-
fault is not self-evident.18 In contrast, both incidence and
prevalence rates make immediate sense for the YLD. The
GBD in 1990 and onwards used an incidence perspective
for both the YLD and the YLL. Recall that DALYs are
calculated for 1 year at a time. The issue of the incidence
versus prevalence approach has to do with the year in
which morbidity is assigned. Under an incidence ap-
proach, all DALYs associated with a diagnostic incident
in a given year, including expected future DALYs, are
assigned to that year. This incidence practice means
that if a person is diagnosed with a chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease in 2005 (moderate DW 0.23), and she
is expected to live for a further 10 years, then
10 0.23¼ 2.30 DALYs are attributed to the disease
burden for the year 2005. Three reasons were initially
given for the practice of having a pure incidence perspec-
tive. First, quantifying incidence YLDs is more consist-
ent with incidence YLLs. Second, an incidence
perspective for YLDs identifies the impact of health
interventions more rapidly. Third, with the prevalence
YLD alternative, there is a risk of uncritical reading
(Murray, 1994, 1996).
The second phase of the GBD (2010–2017) saw the use
of a prevalence perspective of the YLD. This prevalence
perspective implies that YLDs are accounted for one year
at a time, instead of all at once. In the chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease example above, this practice means
that only 1 0.23¼ 0.23 DALYs were accounted for in
2015, and the same will be the case for the next 9 years.
There are at least two rationales given for the switch from
incidence to prevalence YLDs. First, incidence YLDs rely
on strong assumptions about an uncertain future.
Second, under a falling incidence, future years may
come out better than they should (if DALYs should de-
scribe health care needs) because the need for health care
services might still be high (Murray et al., 2012a;
Schroeder, 2016). In this case, the rationales behind
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the choice between an incidence and prevalence YLD can
be seen as descriptive as they concern epistemic forecast-
ing rather than value theory.
Individual versus Societal Burden
The question remains of whether the DALY is concerned
with morbidity and mortality for those who are sick and
dying, for their dependents, or society itself. The DALY
has always been primarily concerned with an individual
burden. However, in the first phase of the GBD, the
DALY also referred to a societal burden. Murray sug-
gested two possible rationales for this concern: first,
the human capital approach, where the value of the
time at each age should be proportional to the product-
ivity at that age. Second, social values were attributed to
age groups that normally act as caregivers for their chil-
dren and parents. As mentioned, these two rationales
were supposed to favor age-weighting (Murray, 1994,
1996). When the GBD also measured societal burden,
there seemed to be no principled reasons for a sharp
cutoff in the count’s lower limit. A concern for societal
burden may imply a gradual increase with regard to dis-
ease burden generated. This is because societal burden
refers to how all but the deceased are affected by a per-
son’s premature death or disability. According to this
line of thinking, it is not unreasonable to claim that
stillbirths also incur at least a minimal degree of societal
burden.
From the GBD 2010 and onwards, societal burden was
excluded. In the words of Murray et al. (2012a, 14)
‘Burden should be assessed individual by individual’.
This omission led some authors to conclude that the
GBD is now almost value-free (Murray et al., 2012a;
Salomon et al., 2012; Salomon et al., 2015; Knudsen
et al., 2016). The choice to omit societal burden seems
reasonable and represents a step toward a slightly more
descriptive DALY. However, even the individual burden
itself implies something of disvalue to the individual,
and it is hard to see that such a concern does not rely
on value theory or other evaluative approaches. Even if
the omission of societal burden can be seen as non-
evaluative, individual disease burden is itself an evalu-
ative concept.
Gradualism versus Non-Gradualism
From the 1990 GBD until the 2010 GBD, the combined
effect of age-weighting and time discounting gave a
gradual curve for disease burden throughout individual
lives. This combined effect implied that the highest pos-
sible number of YLLs was incurred when 10-year-olds
died (Murray et al., 2012a). Importantly, this gradual
function was a result of the combined effect of individual
and societal burden. It is hard to say whether this precise
implication—that the death of 10-year-olds incurred the
greatest number of DALYs—was intended or not.
It is hard to see how a human capital approach would
only matter from birth onwards. When age-weighting
and time discounting were omitted, the GBD-curve
showed a non-gradual function with a sharp discontinu-
ous boundary at birth. Moreover, this non-gradual curve
represents an individual burden only. This latter view
implies that the age at which death becomes a burden
is also when death generates the greatest possible burden.
In the current GBD, the burden of death is assumed to be
the greatest at birth, where neonatal deaths incur around
86 DALYs each (Murray et al., 2012a). Rationales for
gradualism versus non-gradualism are lacking in the
GBD literature but can be found elsewhere (McMahan,
2002; Millum, 2015; Solberg and Gamlund, 2016). The
choice of whether gradualism or non-gradualism should
apply to the DALY may, arguably, be classified as both
descriptive and evaluative. The choice is descriptive if we
assume that there is a true answer as to when the worst
time to die is. However, it is also a value-theoretical
question and therefore evaluative in this sense.
Moreover, if there is no true answer as to when the worst
time to die is, how we evaluate deaths in the DALY
remains an open question that requires reasons that
are directly value-laden. Thus, we hold that the challenge
of gradualism versus non-gradualism in the DALY is an
evaluative concern.
Aggregation (Intra- and Interpersonal)
There are two forms of aggregation in the DALY. First,
intrapersonal aggregation—that is, an aggregation of
burden across time within an individual’s life. In the
GBD study, the individual is the fundamental unit for
the disease burden (Murray et al., 2012a). Several
assumptions need to be in place for intrapersonal aggre-
gation to make sense, and this has been discussed else-
where (Broome, 2004; Hirose, 2015).
The current GBD indirectly assumes that we begin to
exist from the moment of birth. Additionally, it is
assumed that burdens can accumulate within the lives
of individuals (as illustrated in Figure 1). This kind of
intrapersonal aggregation entails the idea that some rele-
vant property (e.g. the brain, our bodies or sentience)
grounds an individual’s identity throughout her life. In
philosophy, this property is called personal identity.
There is little consensus among philosophers about
what constitutes the grounds for personal identity
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(Parfit, 1984; McMahan, 2002; Olson, 2007). Still, to
make sense, there are reasons to believe that the DALY
must rely on the assumption that personal identity is
acquired at birth and continues until the current defin-
ition of death occurs.19
Second, the DALY presupposes interpersonal aggrega-
tion—that is, an aggregation of burden across people, at
least for estimating DWs. Interpersonal aggregation is an
assumption of the DALY that is seldom articulated, even
though the founders of the DALY are probably aware of it.
An important aspect of interpersonal aggregation is addi-
tive aggregation. Regardless of what position one adopts on
the issue of distribution, the choice of employing a straight-
forward additive aggregation formula is a value choice.
Commensurability
Closely related to the aggregation of burden is the issue
of commensurability. There are at least two assumptions
regarding commensurability in the GBD.20 First and
foremost, YLDs quantify disease burden—an inherently
multidimensional construct. More precisely, in the 2015
GBD, the YLD quantifies the burden of 235 distinct con-
ditions. The underlying assumption here is that these
conditions are commensurable as individual burdens.
However, several of these conditions are not intuitively
comparable. Compare, for instance, mild low back pain,
moderate hearing loss and amputation of one arm or
severe dementia. We should ask what these conditions
have in common. To answer this question, we will need
an account that unifies these conditions.
A second concern is the paramount assumption that it
makes sense to aggregate YLDs and YLLs. The idea is that
YLDs and YLLs can be measured on a cardinal ratio scale,
which captures the assumption that YLDs and YLLs are
commensurable as an individual burden (Murray et al.,
2000; Murray and Evans, 2003). However, it is not en-
tirely clear that the YLL measures an individual burden
in the first place, as we do not experience—or even
exist—while ‘being dead’. If the YLL is, in fact, not an
individual burden, then the YLD and the YLL will be
incommensurable qua individual burden. This may be
a severe problem for the DALY as the YLL sets the ref-
erence frame for the YLD and because the majority of the
total disease burden consists of YLLs.
The best candidate for a justification of commensur-
ability is perhaps the fact that the DALY presupposes a
counterfactual account of harm.21 Reference to counter-
factual harm is probably the best candidate for explain-
ing how the YLD is a multidimensional concept, as well
as how the YLD and the YLL are commensurable. Note
that harms and benefits directly concern how our well-
being is affected, and so the concern about commensur-
ability is strongly related to evaluative concerns (Solberg
et al., 2018).
There are reasons to question whether purely descrip-
tive concepts of morbidity and mortality can be com-
mensurable at all. If the YLD and the YLL in the DALY
are to be seen as commensurable, then one will have to
admit that there are evaluative aspects involved in this
measure. However, this concern about commensurabil-
ity is absent in the GBD literature. Schroeder has, how-
ever, responded to this concern. He argues that if we
grant that the DALY is best understood as an index,
then, the concern for YLD-YLL commensurability may
matter less (Schroeder, 2018). Whether or not Schroeder
is right is an open question, but the very assumption of
equivalence in value between YLD-YLL is, in our view,
an evaluative matter.
Summary of Assumptions
In summary, even if we grant a narrow definition of
evaluative assumptions, most of the assumptions that
we have discussed are evaluative. We have provided
strong reasons in support of the view that the DALY
measure should still be regarded as an evaluative en-
deavor. See Table 1 for a summary of the DALY assump-
tions that we have explored.
Why the DALY is Primarily
Evaluative
All measures of morbidity known to us, such as QALYs
and DALYs, erect that scale on evaluative judgments. It is
hard to imagine any way to circumvent evaluative judg-
ments, and the burden of justification lies with those
who claim that this can be done. Thus, there are reasons
to believe that descriptive mortality measures are unsuit-
able for direct comparison with evaluative morbidity
measures without further evaluative adjustments.22
According to this line of reasoning, the DALY is not, in
this publicly accessible sense, descriptive since it is erected
on a scaffold of evaluative assumptions.
Moreover, the DALY measures disease burden, and
burden is a normative term—it connotes something
negative that one wants to discard. This is another sense
in which the DALY is evaluative. The closeness between
disease burden and the monitoring of global health, dis-
cussions on inequalities in health, and the aim of priori-
tization between major health programs should at least
remind us that motivation behind the construction of
the DALY is inherently ethical. If the DALY was
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Table 1. DALY assumptions in the GBD
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descriptive in this stronger sense, then to learn that, say, a
virus-pandemic generated n DALYs would be less inter-
esting. However, DALYs are not intended to be seen as
purely descriptive observations but rather information
that motivates policymakers to act.
It is important to remark that we see nothing wrong
with using an evaluative measure such as the DALY to
measure disease burden. What we take issue with is the
air of authority that comes with claiming objectivity and
a descriptive model. The assumptions underlying the
DALY that we have found are not neutral and demand
scrutiny and continuous reassessment. Accordingly, the
DALY should not be able to evade the ongoing critical
discourse regarding its axiological foundation.23
Conclusion
We acknowledge that the revisions made in conjunction
with the second phase of the GBD (2010–2017) have
made the DALY slightly more descriptive of individual
disease burden. Notwithstanding—as we have argued—
the DALY is still dissimilar from descriptive endeavors
such as the crude prevalence or incidence metrics. Many
evaluative assumptions will, by necessity, remain
embedded in the DALY construct. Modifying these
assumptions may affect both the size and the distribu-
tion of disease burden across the globe. Our exposition
has been a call for more transparency as well as contin-
ued scholarly and public scrutiny of the DALY. We con-
clude that the DALY is primarily evaluative and
encourage scholars to continue to seek a firmer ethical
foundation of this influential measure.
Conflict of Interest
O.F.N. has been a co-author on several GBD-articles
since 2010.
Notes
1. Christopher J. L. Murray, the leading architect of the
DALY, dedicated 80 pages to the evaluative choices
in the DALY in his article ‘Rethinking DALYs’
(Murray, 1996).
2. The view that the DALY is now a descriptive rather
than evaluative measure is evident from the title of a
book by the leading architects of the DALY: An in-
tegrative metaregression framework for descriptive
epidemiology (Flaxman et al., 2015).
3. The last quote describes the GBD effort broadly.
4. For a few examples of DALY publications in high-
ranking academic journals, see The Lancet (Salomon
et al., 2015) and The New England Journal of
Medicine (Murray and Lopez, 2013). For major
organizations and institutions, see the World
Health Organization (2018) and the World Bank
(1993). Furthermore, the DALY is expected to play
a significant role in monitoring the United Nations’
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see
Reddy, 2016; IHME, 2018).
5. Please note that our aim is not to construct a novel
and rigorous philosophical distinction between
evaluative and descriptive assumptions. Instead,
this is a first step, in line with previous work on value
assumptions in the DALY measure.
Table 1. (continued)
Assumption GBD 1990–1996 GBD 2010–2017 Descriptive
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2017). We believe that most underlying assumptions and their corresponding rationales are evaluative rather than descriptive.
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6. For more on these methods, see, e.g. Gold et al.
(2002) and Weinstein et al. (2009).
7. In the second phase of the GBD (after the publica-
tion of the 2010 GBD), a slightly different method
from life time DALYs is used. The YLD is now a
prevalence rather than an indices measure.
8. In line with the current terminology within epi-
demiology, we do believe that it is constructive to
continue to use and reserve the term descriptive for
certain mortality measures (such as the CDRs), even
if they must all invoke certain assumptions. Most
notably, all mortality measures must rely on a spe-
cific definition of death. In the last fifty years, the
brain-death criterion has been the dominant view.
9. In contrast to Schroeder, we consider the issue of
grouping conditions and disabilities as something
outside the DALY-paradigm.
10. We focus on these additional assumptions because
they are scarcely discussed in the DALY literature, or
not discussed at all, while relating in a direct way to
the DALY construct, and small changes in these
assumptions will have significant implications for
the total amount of disease burden. There is also a
parallel discussion about what purposes the DALY
model is suitable (Arnesen and Kapiriri, 2004; Voigt
and King, 2014). Since this discussion is beyond the
DALY model itself, we do not discuss it here.
11. The standard gamble and the time trade-off are
similar methods to the person trade-off, but instead
of the number of people, they establish a relative
burden.
12. One may, of course, refer to such deeply biological
preferences as non-choices and pseudo-preferences
in this sense.
13. For the utility theoretical foundation of the DW, see
Neumann and Morgenstern (2004).
14. As Ubel et al. (1996) show, priority-setting policies
that do not survey the public views on trade-offs and
reflect these are often disbanded. There is also a fur-
ther concern about who to survey in the trade-offs.
This concern involves balancing many variables,
such as age, sex, culture, personal experiences and
expertise. For more on this issue, see e.g. Weinstein
et al. (2009) and Schroeder (2016).
15. In contrast, negative value has been practiced in the
QALY.
16. This latter point is also a value judgment, as scholars
reasonably disagree about whether every life year
lost has the same value regardless of age.
17. There are several definitions of stillbirths. In this
article, we accord with the WHO’s definition where
fetal death between the 28th gestational week and
birth count as stillbirths.
18. First, the DALY measure seems to presume that
being dead has a value of 1. Second, one could
have applied a prevalence YLL, where one YLL was
attributed for each year. See, e.g. Bradley (2009) for
more on this issue.
19. The ‘counting from birth’ practice is probably
chosen for political reasons. Our point is that an
underlying account of personal identity is necessary
for the practice to make sense.
20. Commensurability, in this context, means that the
things we are measuring (such as A, B and C) have
something relevant F in common that allows us to
measure them on the same scale.
21. For recent developments on the counterfactual ac-
count of harm, see, e.g. Klocksiem (2012) and Feit
(2016).
22. Perhaps the best example is the QALY, which is
acknowledged as an evaluative measure. See, e.g.
Weinstein et al. (2009).
23. CTS had the initial idea and drafted the first manu-
script. All authors circulated and revised the manu-
script versions and held working sessions; MB made
the figures and formulae; and all authors revised and
approved the final manuscript.
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Beyene, A. S., Bhatt, S., Biadgilign, S., Bikbov, B.,
Birlik, S. M., Bisanzio, D., Bjertness, E., Blore, J. D.,
Bourne, R. R. A., Brainin, M., Brazinova, A.,
Breitborde, N. J. K., Brown, A., Buckle, G. C., Burch,
M., Butt, Z. A., Campos-Nonato, I. R., Campuzano, J.
C., Cárdenas, R., Carpenter, D. O., Carrero, J. J.,
Carter, A., Casey, D. C., Casta~neda-Orjuela, C. A.,
Rivas, J. C., Castro, R. E., Catalá-López, F., Cercy,
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